Although criticized as potentially invasive, profiling has recently been promoted as a means for finding potential terrorists, and particularly airplane hijackers. Based upon sophisticated data-mining technologies, new forms of profiling have seemed, whatever the privacy issues that they raise, to offer more objective alternatives to earlier airline profiling systems, which appear to have been based on nothing more than a sense that certain groups of people are not proper passengers, that they are out of place on an airplane. But in fact, the example of geodemographic systems suggests that an inevitable element of profiling is the appeal to sets of simple narratives. Indeed, far from being merely expository devices, such narratives are central to the profile's analytical structure; as a consequence, while their promoters laud the profiling systems as neutral analytical devices, embedded within them is a sorting system that might more accurately be described as encoding an unstable world of Foucauldian similitudes.
Introduction
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , concern in the United States about airline security increased dramatically. Members of the public demanded that a more effective system be developed, and under the administration of President George W. Bush and his Attorney General, John Ashcroft, a series of steps were taken -perhaps most notably the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) -and proposals made. One of the most dramatic of these proposals was that a system termed CAPPS II (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System) be created. 2 As initially proposed, the system would have involved the collation and analysis by the government of massive amounts of data about each purchaser of an airline ticket. Those data would have been analyzed using an as-yet-undetermined system, and records of individuals who appeared potentially dangerous would have been kept for a long period, as much as fifty years.
In the case of geodemographics, where the desire is merely to increase one's market share, this reliance may to the average person be of no particular concern. But in the matter of airline security the lessons from geodemographic systems suggest that data-centered systems, just to the extent that their analysis rests on a process of envisioning individuals, objects, and places as elements of pre-imagined narratives of untoward acts, are likely to fail, both by accusing the innocent and overlooking the guilty. Indeed, notwithstanding the scientific trappings with which they are surrounded, the central role of symbol and narrative within the systems suggests that they are inevitably constrained by the limitations of time, place, class, culture, race, and gender, and of the institutions within which they operate, and that the negative features of the systems may not be remediable.
At home in the sky
In the United States, the issue of air safety has occasionally occupied public attention, usually after an airline hijacking, but these moments of concern have typically been punctuated by long periods of inattention, where safety is a subject of conversation only insofar as attempts to ensure it are perceived as nuisances. Those 'nuisances' have typically been based upon the profiling of individuals, and the application of a kind of triage. Passengers are sorted into three groups, those who are safe, those about whom more needs to be known, and those who are not to be trusted. Yet if in its bare lineaments this seems an obvious thing to do, it is worth noting that it was until recently not at all obvious that one should or even might do so. Indeed, the very idea of the 'treacherous' traveler is rather new, and the idea of the 'trusted' traveler is even newer.
Consider the situation in 1961. In a seemingly simpler world, those who flew on commercial airliners were largely business people -mostly white men -and the relatively wealthy. In a way, the demographics of the airline passenger matched those of the white, middle-class suburbs and urban enclaves from which those passengers were drawn. People who flew were viewed as naturally respectable. Everyone else drove, took the bus or train, or stayed home.
Indeed, a look at an advertisement for an airline in the 1950s will show a group of nicely dressed passengers, mostly men with suits and ties. They will sometimes be grouped in a lounge, in a scene reminiscent of today's airport lounges. As one flight attendant described a 707 flight across the Atlantic, at the junction between this old and a newer era:
The new plane of the 1960s for crossing the Atlantic was the Boeing 707. We referred to it as the Starlight Express, because it was the mode of transportation for so many celebrities. On a long flight we often had live entertainment when a small group would take out their guitars and lead the entire cabin in a singalong.... Bridge games spontaneously started in the small lounge area. Flight attendants were called 'hostesses' because they wanted the passengers to feel like guests in their homes (Cruz and Papadopoulos, 2003: 35) .
This flight attendant is not alone in appealing to the discourse of nostalgia in the etymological sense, as 'homesickness' (Boym, 2001) ; here, as elsewhere, the airplane and airline industry of the past is very often represented with a sense of loss or decline. Cruz and Papadopoulos, in a study of passenger behavior, appeal to this same trope as they describe service then and now:
And this nostalgia expresses a sense that the cabin of an airplane was once a particular sort of place, but a sort of place that no longer exists. It was a place that was constructed in two ways. Physically, it was a re-creation or simulation of a particular architectural configuration, a kind of living-room or lounge in the sky; and it was a place where people acted as one does in such a place (or at least performed a version of it). In both ways the commercial airliner was constructed as a place wherein certain sorts of people naturally belonged; they were people who looked, acted, and interacted in certain ways (Tuan, 1974; Goffman, 1959) . In these accounts and representations no one is out of place.
One may be inclined here to think that people trusted one another, but the matter is more complex than that. In fact, it is more accurate to say that one was not trusted, because the need for trust did not exist. One only asks whether a person is trustworthy where the possibility exists that the answer will be 'no' (Seligman, 1997) . Until the 1960s people just got on airplanes, as passengers, flight attendants (or then, hostesses), or pilots and copilots, and flew; it was clear that they belonged, and if they did not, that fact was quickly visible. If it was accepted that there was a connection between a person's appearance and his or her status, it was also accepted that there was a connection between that status and the proper place in airports and airliners of passengers, airline and airport personnel, and the general public. This was an era of stereotyping.
The traveler in question
Within this era it had not seemed unreasonable to believe in such stereotypes, to imagine that one might read the identity of a person from his or her appearance. But in the 1960s these stereotypes were called into question, and it was then that we moved into a new era, the era of the profile. If a stereotype is a simplified image of a person -the 'welfare mother' of the 1970s, the 'yuppie' of the 1980s, the 'soccer mom' of the early 1990s -a profile exists only within a larger system of typifications. Consciously created, profiles attempt to divide a population into groups, where a group is (at least in principle) defined in terms not of a set of defining attributes, but rather of its propensity to engage in certain activities, or in fact, not to engage in those activities.
Within the commercial aviation industry the move into an era of profiling was signaled by two developments. First, in the p eriod from the late 1950s to the early 1960s there was a tremendous growth in the commercial aviation system. Its symbol was the jet-powered airliner. Commercial jet flights had begun in 1952, with BOAC's ill-fated de Havilland Comet; but the Boeing 707, first delivered in 1957, formed the foundation of a new, and more extensive, passenger system.
Originally designed as a medium-range craft, the 707 was modified for long-range use, and it, along with the Douglas DC-8, was put into service in both trans-continental and trans-oceanic routes. The two were soon followed by the Boeing 727 (1963), specifically designed for short to medium range flights and smaller airports, and the similar DC-9. In 1967 Boeing introduced the even smaller, short-range 737, as further competition for the DC-9, with a range of 1150 miles. And finally, in January 1970 Boeing i ntroduced the wide-body 747, capable of carrying 375 passengers on trans-oceanic flights; it was soon followed by the Douglas DC-10 and the Lockheed L-1011.
One index of the dimension of the change in the air passenger industry is that it took the 747 less than six months to transport one-million passengers (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2002) . But as important as the number of passengers being flown was the increased diversity of the places among which they were flying. If flying ceased to be an activity of the well-to-do, it also ceased to be an activity of those who lived or worked in large urban areas.
The year 1961 saw a second development, the first a ttempted h ijacking -then termed 'skyjacking' -of an airplane to Cuba; it was followed the next year by a successful attempt.
These early, isolated hijackings were by and large carried out by individuals who wished to leave the country, as in the case of disaffected Cuban refugees. (St. John, 1991: 49) After a period in which there averaged only four hijackings a year (St. John, 1991: 9) , in 1968 the number of hijackings, bombings, and armed assaults all increased dramatically. (For a summary, see: United States Office of Civil Aviation Security, 1981). These hijackings were increasingly accompanied, especially internationally, by bombings of aircraft and by attacks on airports and airline offices.
In response, in 1969 the Federal Aviation Administration established a 'Task Force on the Deterrence of Air Piracy' (Reighard et al., 1978) . The Task Force concluded that while it might be desirable to search each and every passenger, it was certainly not feasible to do so. But neither was it necessary, because "the Task Force study of hijacker characteristics revealed hijackers to be very different from typical passengers" (ibid., 1978: 57-58) . So what was needed was a system for picking out the small number of likely miscreants.
Using an epidemiological metaphor, the task force turned to a system of profiling:
Using systems analysis techniques, a profile of 25 to 30 characteristics likely to be found in an aircraft hijacker was developed. In its preparation, highest priority was given to finding an instrument which could readily be explained to airline customer services personnel, and which could be utilized by them without the necessity of independent value judgment. Only a simple mental check-off should be required to determine quickly the presence of a possible hijacker. Moreover, the profile had to be structured as a 'secure' instrument.... (Reighard et al., 1978: 57) 
[Emphasis added]
Although the exact nature of the profiles was kept confidential, according to Richard Clutterbuck, "One of the profiles was to eliminate all except those between 16 and 65 who had bought a single ticket for cash. Surprisingly this left only 2 per cent to be searched" (Clutterbuck, 1975: 116) .
So the justification for the use of profiling was that most of the 150 million passengers who flew commercially each year fit the old model -they were urban and suburban, middle-class, white, and male -and it made sense to eliminate them from suspicion. All that was needed was a means to ferret out those who remained, those who might be hijackers, and who ought to be given additional attention.
Clutterbuck, continuing, noted that "Other profiles -which were kept confidential -further narrowed this to half of 1 per cent " (1975: 116) . Among the data accumulated, and presumably used in this secondary profiling process, were the following:
Within this profiling system, the focus was on an individual who might carry onto an airplane, on his person or in his hand luggage, a weapon to be used in commandeering that airplane. Indeed, the profiles centered on simple stories, "A deranged man, or a homesick Cuban, or someone who is simply greedy, will carry a gun aboard, force the pilot to fly somewhere, and -he hopes -make a getaway". These were stories of people and a place -the commercial jetliner -where they did not belong. (Reighard et al., 1978: 58-59) So by the end of the 1960s there had been significant changes in the nature of the passenger aviation system. Consider these three elements:
• In the past, passengers had treated the experience of flying as a social occasion, one in which they traveled with people very much like themselves, and with whom they could expect to engage in social interaction. Now, with airlines providing mass transportation and with the advent of an epidemic of hijacking, there was an uneasy sense that one's seatmate might not be what he seemed. The airplane had become a different and more segmented and individualizing sort of place.
• In the past, although for most people flying had been exotic, for those who did fly it quickly came to be treated as an everyday activity, little different from any other; families could see departing passengers to the gate, or greet arriving ones as they walked across the tarmac. The experience was in that respect not very different from the experience of taking a train. But now, like the airplane, the airport had been transformed. The area where passengers were dropped off and where they checked in was in a sense viewed as an area of chaos, a kind of wilderness, one where anyone or anything might be. But beyond the metal detectors lay what has come to be called a 'sterile area', one in which only passengers and others who had passes a security check might go. And beyond the gate lay yet another area, the air operations area (AOA), or 'air side', access to which was restricted to airline or airport personnel. The airport had become a different and more segmented sort of place.
• In the past, domestic passengers had been able to gain access to an aircraft basically for the price of a ticket. With cash, it was possible to fly anonymously; no identification was required. Although at the end of the 1960s it remained possible to fly anonymously, one who paid with cash was immediately under suspicion, as, indeed, was every passenger. Every passenger was judged against a (still) secret profile, based largely but apparently not entirely on his or her behavior, from ticket-purchase to airplane door.
We had entered the age of profiling.
On profiling
In its typically understated way, the Oxford English Dictionary gives a sense of the deep ambiguity of the term 'profile'. Used originally to refer to a visual representation (normally a side view) of a person, it only gradually came to refer to a verbal representation. At the same time, while in one sense a profile can quite obviously be accurate as in, "The shadow of a face on the wall is a correct profile (1833 R. ARNOTT Physics (ed. 5) II. I. 182)", we also find profiles treated with suspicion, "He excited great commotion among the Sioux by drawing one of their great chiefs in profile. 'Why was half his face left out,' they asked (1865 LUBBOCK Preh. Times xiv. (1869) 518)".
Against the background of this dual ambiguity -visual vs. verbal, accurate vs. oversimplifying, and even deceptive -the term when used to describe humans was traditionally particular; it referred to individuals as individuals, and not as members of groups. We see this, for example, in "Mr. Ehrlichman said that the need for a psychiatric profile of Dr. Ellsberg had prompted the decision to break into the office (1973 Times 26 July 8/2)".
Indeed, it was not until the time of the Ehrlichman example, the 1970s, that one began to see the term used to typify people, to describe them by associating them with a group, as in "Given that we have participants of particular socio-economic profiles but not taking their individuality into account and given the specific situation, these are the choices which are most expected (1977 Language LIII. 186)".
Symbolic profiling
If we look back to the airline profiling of the 1960s and early 1970s, we see a profiling that appeals t o Reighard's 'mental check-off'. This is not the 'socio-economic profile' of the last example, but rather a profile that is more traditional, that resonates with the OED's earlier examples. This is no surprise, if we consider the following. In 1961:
• almost no one traveled on airplanes, except the wealthy and businessmen;
• the great majority of credit-card transactions using national cards (American Express, Diners Club, etc.) were made by people in business. Few individuals relied upon credit cards; • the checks provided with consumer checking accounts were often not imprinted with the account-holder's name, and almost certainly did not include a consumer's account number, which was only supplied when the check was returned to the originating bank;
• automobile drivers licenses did not contain photographs of their holders;
• an American citizen did n ot need a passport in order to travel within the western hemisphere;
• one needed to get a social security card only when one wished to get a job for which social security taxes were paid; • credit reporting agencies were local;
• there was no ZIP code, and a small direct mail-industry;
• few people outside of those employed by the government or by large corporations had medical insurance;
• large-scale anti-poverty programs did not exist;
• DNA testing was only done in science fiction novels; and • only about eighty percent of American households had telephones.
In effect, the great majority of pools of data now available for the creation of profiles, by both those in the direct marketing industry and those in government, did not exist. So the mental check-off, a slightly more formalized (and institutionalized) version of the stereotyping of an earlier era, was both familiar and, more important, possible.
One might best describe this as a matter of 'symbolic' profiling. It is symbolic because it appeals not simply to attributes or criteria, but rather to elements that are open-ended. Each of the symbols that makes up the profile is imagined to be an element of a configuration, a personal identity, and a person's identity tells us where he or she belongs, and does not. In this case, the profiling used the attributes of the passenger and his or her ticket as a set of symbols that that person might not belong on the airplane.
Interactive profiling
But in the case of airline security this symbolic profiling is merely a prelude to a process of 'interactive' profiling. There, an airline employee begins from the 'mental check list,' which has indicated that the person in question may not belong on an airplane, and the employee may engage in any of a number of activities, including searching the person, searching that person's luggage, or asking him or her a number of questions. The aim is through this interaction imaginatively to construct a narrative of that person's activity. What is he really doing? Is he a mentally deranged person, desperate to escape his troubles by escaping the country? Is he a criminal, out to hold the plane and its passengers hostage, for a huge ransom? Is he a Cuban émigré, now homesick? Or is he simply a somewhat frazzled businessman, who has bought a ticket with cash at the last minute because an important deal has suddenly emerged, and he has lost his credit card? If so, he will, to use Jackson's terms, 'test green' and be 'free to go.' Note that here, and in the context of the available data during the 1970s, the validity of the identity claimed by the ticket holder was less important than the sense that the airline employee was able to gather by looking at and asking brief questions of that individual. And note, too, that this is in fact the same process that has long been used within law enforcement, and that, before the development of police radio and then computer systems, was the only system available to the policeman on a beat. In one familiar version, imagine that I am a police officer, patrolling the New Jersey Turnpike. I see an African-American woman, driving a not-too-new car, which has a sticker in the back window, portraying the Jamaican flag. She appears to be driving especially carefully. In combination, these elements match a 'profile' of someone who is carrying drugs. I pull her over and peer into the car; it is messy, with evidence that she has been eating on the go; this adds to the pattern, suggesting that she may have been making a long trip, carrying something illegal. This pattern begins to suggest that she fits a further profile; she is not merely a drug user, but a courier.
Here, in the case of the police as of the airlines, profiling was until recently based in large measure on a process of authentication without identification. In each case what we might be tempted to think of as 'factors' act rather as symbols, and the person engaged in the process of profiling 'reads' those symbols interactively, eliciting responses from the subject, and attempting to gauge through his actions whether the identity claimed by the subject 'holds together.'
The move from symbolic to interactive profiling involves what one could describe as a process of 'fleshing out' the identity that the symbolic profile has attempted to discern. But this process of fleshing out, just to the extent that it operates by attempting to determine what the person is doing, is a process of narrativizing that person's actions. It operates by embedding the symbols that made up the symbolic profile into a narrative within which they make sense. Here, of course, there may be multiple competing narratives, with the employee and the passenger negotiating about which is to be accepted.
Identification documents, computer assisted passenger profiling, and the development of the stable traveler
In 1996, on the heels of the World Trade Center (February 26, 1993) and Oklahoma City Federal Building (April 19, 1995) bombings, and then the Clinton administration's attempt to pass the Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act, the FAA issued a Security Directive that in an important way set the stage for a new way of thinking about how to decide who belonged on an airplane. As typically represented to potential passengers, Security Directive 96-05, issued in August 1996, declared that, "all passengers who appear to be 18 years of age will present a government issued picture ID, or two other forms of ID, at least one of which must be issued by a government authority". In fact, the rule is not quite as clear as that. For it continues with, "If the passenger cannot produce identification, or it cannot be reconciled to match the t icket, the passenger becomes a ' selectee'". A selectee then needs to have his or her luggage -and perhaps body -thoroughly searched, but must otherwise be treated like any other passenger (U. S., 2002: 201 c (1)).
Despite its ambiguity, it remains that the expectation that a passenger will have governmentissued identification has largely been taken to be underpinned by FAA regulations. And this would seem in that sense to be a clear move beyond symbolic profiling, with its focus on associations raised by a person's appearance, and interactive profiling, with its interrogation of the individual in an attempt to narrativize these parts within a temporally-framed structure. Here, the identification requirement seems to suggest, is a clear-cut matter of the stabilization of the identity of the passenger within a set of trusted institutions.
But in fact, this requirement by no means implemented such a stabilization. For the directive merely required that the person have a government-issued document, with a photograph and in the name that appeared on the passenger's ticket. What did not occur was a next step, of entering the data from the identification document into the passenger name record (PNR), and the creation of a permanent link between the two. So not required was that the name rigidly designate that person, and connect it to the other elements of his or her life.
Rather, the directive, in the end, and like systems before, relied on the coherence of a person's identity. Is this person the one whom he claims to be? If the airline employee believes so, then the terms of the regulation have been met. And indeed, with respect to security, the positive effects of this regulation were more likely connected to its power to dissuade certain people from traveling by air than to its ability to help to establish a system within which one might with some certainty determine who had been on a particular airplane.
At about the same time, a replacement for the profiling system that had been developed in the late 1960s emerged. The new system, termed the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), was first introduced by Northwest Airlines, and by the end 1997 had been adopted by all carriers. The workings of the system -actually, as before each airline had its own -have remained secret, but it is generally believed that as with the earlier system CAPPS uses only a small number of variables.
CAPPS differed from earlier profiling systems in extending its reliance on data contained in the passengers PNR. Once a passenger's data are entered into an airline's reservation system, if those data match a particular profile the record is flagged, and the result is -at the least -that greater attention is paid to that person by airport security personnel. Although as with earlier systems the details of the CAPPS profile are secret, it has been widely reported that tickets paid for with cash or purchased at the last minute are considered a bad sign, as is the purchase of a one-way ticket. So in fact, by all accounts the profile of the treacherous traveler has not changed since the introduction of screening systems in 1969; we remain, leaving aside nuances, with the very same story; to the deranged man, or the homesick Cuban, or someone who is simply greedy, we have added the terrorist.
But as in the case of the security directive, and notwithstanding appearances raised by the use of computerized information systems, the CAPPS system does not i nvolve the creation of a link between the PNR and the information contained in his or her identification document. Rather, and like previous systems, it looks only to the coherence of the items provided, and to the ways in which they do or do not match a set of possible sets of symbols and narratives. Here, from the means of payment to the timing of the ticket purchase to the type of ticket, much of this information could be easily manipulated by a knowing traveler; and the system seemed more likely to identify the less sophisticated than the more dangerous passenger.
Geodemographic profiling systems and the necessity of narrative
Nonetheless, together Security Directive 96-05 and CAPPS jointly indicate a turn toward the development of an informational profiling system, and one that does move t oward the requirement that each passenger's identity be positively affirmed within an ongoing and trusted system.
Informational profiling
In symbolic and interactional profiling one determines whether a person fits a profile by means of a limited amount of information, used to determine whether a person belongs in a particular place, and then through interaction, where actions and responses to queries are used to enable one to construct a simple narrative to account for that person's actions. This is a familiar process, and is one that is commonly invoked in legal proceedings, where in the United States the existence of the appropriate pattern is seen in fourth amendment jurisprudence as sufficient reason, or 'probable cause', for the issuance of a search warrant.
But when we turn to the matter of terrorism, the link between appearance and reality seems far less clear; indeed, the very possibility of succeeding as a terrorist seems to require that one not visibly appear to be a terrorist, that one look like a 'regular' person, that one look as though he (most often) belongs where he is. So this traditional way of profiling may be of limited utility in the case of the sophisticated terrorist -as opposed to the garden-variety hijacker -who understands the need to 'fit in'. He appears little different from those around him; he does not drive an old car, or decorate his car with stickers celebrating Bob Marley.
Recognizing this problem, the systems now proposed for future use in discerning potential terrorists do not rely simply on appearance and on visible actions; drawing from CAPPS and from Security Directive 96-05 they rely on additional information. In this sense, the new profiles are less like the simple sets of visible images used by law-enforcement offices and more like the products of sophisticated computer models, ones based on numerical taxonomy, multiple regression, and neural networks. They are rather less like the profiles used in law enforcement and more like the profiles used in the marketing and geodemographics industry, where a wide range of data may be used in an attempt to discern a pattern, one that may be used to sell products.
But is there really a difference between the two forms of profiles? I shall argue in what follows that far from being distinct, with symbolic and interactional profiling simple and straightforward, but subjective and of questionable accuracy, and informational profiling sophisticated, scientific, and objective, the two, in the end, rely in similar ways on sets of narratives. Each relies on stories about activities that are proper and ones that are i mproper, about activities that belong in particular places and activities that do not. Each in the end relies on a simple and unstable story, of the treacherous -or trusted -traveler.
Informational profiling, often absent the term 'profile,' has a long history within the advertising and marketing industries. Central to marketing new products, or marketing existing products to new groups or new places has always been that one wanted reason to believe that the individuals at issue would in the future do things that they had not in the past done, that they would buy products that had not been available to them, or perhaps to anybody. The problem is solved by constructing a narrative within which the customer does something that she has not previously done, and by establishing the plausibility of that narrative. 5 The rise of geodemographic profiling Within the United States, as elsewhere, it is common in marketing and advertising to appeal to popular-cultural understandings of social groups, such as 'Yuppies', 'GenXers', and 'Baby Boomers' (Curry, 1992) , and to use those understandings in formulating profiles of the dispositions associated with those groups. But during the 1970s a new form, geodemographic profiling, emerged. This form appealed not to ideas of community, but to ideas of neighborhood and place; the creators of geodemographics appealed to what in the United States is a compelling belief, that as Claritas, an early geodemographics provider, put the matter, 'You are where you live', or 'YAWL'. They were able to suggest that each of us, every day, is faced with a compelling truth, that we are like our neighbors.
Developed by Claritas, CACI, and others, geodemographic systems extended informational profiling by drawing upon a wide range of government data, aggregated at the level of the block, block group, census tract, and later ZIP Code (Weiss, 1994; Weiss, 1988) . Using these, and additional commercially available data, they could describe residents of a particular neighborhood as having a particular profile, one that could be characterized in statistical terms (Finlay, 1980; Walsh, 1982; Beaumont and Inglis, 1989) . Geodemographics in obvious ways resembles certain forms of cultural analysis. A central aim in much cultural analysis is, after all, to identify a group of individuals who share some set of features. But with roots in the directmarketing and site-location industries, the creators of geodemographic systems were much less interested in the theoretical niceties of the profiles that they created than in the ways in which those profiles could be used to predict the behavior of the individuals that fit them. Indeed, central to this form of profiling was a concern not with the ideas or beliefs that typified a group or were held by an individual, but rather with the actions -and especially the future actions -of individual members of a group. To fit a profile meant to be predisposed to act in a certain way in certain situations.
The creators of the systems boasted about the large number of variables, often several hundred, that made up a profile. In fact, the use of numerical taxonomy, wherein clusters were defined through a process that measured the distances among objects in n-dimensional space, and where 'n' referred to the number of variables, might well be seen as a forerunner of today's data mining. As a consequence, when told that a person fit a geodemographic profile, and hence could be predicted to, say, buy a certain kind of wine, one might have no sense at all of what the elements of that profile were. And if this were the end of the story a potential user of profiles might well seem warranted in feeling as though he was being asked to buy a pig in a poke. But the lack of explanatory details, let alone of theoretical underpinnings, made little difference to the credibility of geodemographic profiling, at least to the extent that it was forward looking. For within the systems the main concern was with being able to predict that when faced with a particular set of circumstances a person would l ikely act in a particular way. When given a choice between two new cars, shaving systems, wines, or political candidates, is she likely to buy this one and not that one?
The return to the symbolic Over the years, the sophistication of geodemographic systems has in various ways increased dramatically. Certainly the methods of statistical analysis have changed, as have the range of data that are used. But so too have there been developments in the ways in which geodemographics represents the profiles that it discerns. The first geodemographic systems simply gave numbers to individual profiles, and hence to those neighborhoods, which were arrayed in terms of very broad sets of socioeconomic categories, such as age, household composition, and income. As a consequence, those who wished to use the systems were faced with a question very much like that faced by the social scientist: I am looking for the neighborhood within which people are likely regularly to buy champagne; how do I find it if I have no figures on champagne purchases? The answer was to use surrogate variables, alone or in combination; in the case of champagne one might use income or educational status, or perhaps, and typically surreptitiously, race or ethnicity. 'Wealthy educated white people drink champagne; poor uneducated Hispanics do not', was a typical such answer.
But rather early, certainly by the late 1970s, some of the producers of geodemographic systems instituted a change that, while on the face of it simple, set the stage for a different way of thinking about this question. Claritas and others began to name the neighborhoods. And so we had 'Archie Bunker's neighborhood' and 'furs and station wagons' and 'barely making it'. To name a neighborhood profile, and by implication a pattern of activity, is not merely to provide a mnemonically preferable indexical. Rather, it is to change the way in which the profile works as a representation. For the use of names, and particularly ones that are embedded in popular culture, brings with it -intentionally -a series of symbolic associations.
Without such a system of naming, one might have been inclined to think in the matter of champagne that those who purchase it do so because they fit within a particular socioeconomic category; an anomaly, a poor person who purchased it, could be seen as something to be expected, as a simple matter of probability. But now, one was inclined to say, 'Archie Bunker doesn't drink champagne!' What was a statistical matter has become a violation of a cultural norm. Here profiles are read as assemblages of beliefs and activities, connected with one another not causally but semiotically. We live, in a sense, in Foucault's (1973) world of similitudes, where certain objects and actions and places go together, and others do not.
But here the information-rich geodemographic profile has taken on the features of a system of symbolic profiling. And here it has as a consequence both imploded and exploded. The many variables that constitute it have been compressed; where we had dozens, in some cases hundreds, of variables, we now have Archie Bunker, or soccer and minivans. But at the same time, the profile threatens to explode into an almost limitless set of associations, into the biography of all the world's Archie Bunkers.
This ambiguity -where an informational profile takes on features of a symbolic profile -in fact echoes problems that have long been associated with profiling. It is common to find courtroom arguments about whether, based on what they saw, police had probable cause to believe that the people in question had committed a crime. Did these actions fit those of a criminal? There a small number of signs can sometimes make large difference. For example in Minnesota v. Carter (Minnesota v. Carter, 1998; see also: Butterfoss, 1999 ), a case concerning cocaine possession and distribution, a key issue appears to have been whether one of the principals had been wearing slippers or 'street' shoes; her having worn slippers was seen as evidence that she had more than a business connection with the other individuals involved. The court on the one hand turned to rather a simple image of a cocaine-dealing transaction, and on the other embraced the analysis of the minutiae of such a transaction.
Geodemographic profiling and the appeal to narrative
The potential instability of geodemographic profiling, where a very large amount of information is collapsed into a much smaller set of dispositions (she will more likely do this than that) and attributes (he prefers to wear this than that), but where those dispositions and attributes are not 'themselves' but rather symbols of a social or geographical identity that is subject to multiple understandings, has both ontological and epistemological moments. What kind of things are these geodemographic profiles? And how do we come to know, to identify them? In the event, the geodemographics industry resolved both of these problems through a representational strategy. They appealed to narrative.
Until the late 1980s, the industry had identified profiles through the use of numbered categories, later supplemented with catchy names and with teasers, 'This group subscribes to Barron's at three times the national average'. But at that point Claritas and others began to add to these, and in their promotional material began to provide v ignettes. For example, in 'National Demographics & Lifestyles' (NDL) Cohorts we find:
Margot checks the clasp on her heavy gold necklace one last time and smoothes it so it lies fiat. This is their third .fund raiser this month, but for the first time she's ready before Elliott, thanks to his late tee-off. She glances at the clock. He'd better get out of that shower soon. It won't look good if the chairman of the board is late for the symphony benefit. She reads the day's mail while she waits. A letter from their daughter, half crazed with midterms. Margot chuckles at her rantings-you'd think she was the first person to endure the rigors of med school. She puts the letter aside. Credit card bills, a catalog, a postcard from their son on winter break in Costa Rica. She checks the postmark. Only took three months to get here. Elliott walks into the room, taking a final tug on a perfect bow tie. Have you seen my cummerbund? Wow, you look great, hon. He bends to kiss her cheek. Margot smiles. "The red one's on the bed, the black one's on the char: Take your pick." "Thanks." Smoothing his wet hair, Elliott heads back to the bedroom. Margot picks up a magazine. In a minute he'll be back for help with his cuff links.
In the form of short narratives, these vignettes follow a typical member of a particular profile group through a part of a day. Catchy and ironic, they are remarkably effective at pointing to the possibilities and limitations of a particular group, and in particular, at the ways in which members of those groups make everyday decisions about money.
They do so by moving away from the straightforward appeal to statistical analyses. Rather, they focus on the symbolic nature of the objects that make up the worlds of the i ndividuals in question, seeing people as constructing themselves from those symbolic materials. And they see those individuals as members of families, households, and neighborhoods that are forward looking, that construct their identities through the decisions they make and the actions that they undertake, where those decisions and actions come to comprise a life the normative structure of which can best be captured through narrative. After the fundraiser, will Margot and Elliot cap off the evening by hijacking an airplane and flying to Cuba? And what of the son in Costa Rica? A potential convert to the Shining Path? Perhaps not.
The new passenger profile
If the process of profiling within the private sector seems over the last thirty years to have become increasingly sophisticated, until 2002 profiling within the air travel industry had by and large remained where it was in 1960. If there had been changes, including the development of CAPPS, the informational elements of profiling had been minimal, and the industry had largely relied upon a process of symbolic and interactional profiling.
But in 2003, the newly formed Transportation Security Agency (TSA), which had previously been part of the Department of Transportation, set out to create a new version of CAPPS, popularly termed 'CAPPS II'. As initially proposed, CAPPS II was to be the transportationsecurity equivalent of the credit report or mortgage score. Data about individuals from their PNRs would be linked with data available elsewhere, both publicly and in government files, and a score would be computed. Using the most sophisticated of statistical tools, passengers would be categorized as green, orange, or red, as trustworthy, perhaps questionable, or untrustworthy, even treacherous.
In nine months the TSA drew up a set of specifications, provided money to four consortia for proposals, and on March 1, 2003, let a contract to a group led by Lockheed Martin, partnered with Delta Airlines, and several less-known companies. As the Seattle Times described it:
Lockheed Martin received a $469,179 grant for its effort. Industry officials said Lockheed is working with the Las Vegas company Systems Research & Development, which has received funding from In-Q-Tel, the CIA venturecapital arm. Using a system called Non-Obvious Relationship Awareness, the Las Vegas system can sort through oceans of data in real time, seeking links among people. It can also determine when an individual has transposed names or intentionally tried to obscure personal details. That's what it has done for MGM Mirage and other Las Vegas casino companies worried about card counters and organized gangs of cheaters.
( O'Harrow, 2002) Although the TSA referred to CAPPS II as a "a passive system" and one that is "a narrowly focused threat assessment tool", (Transportation Security Administration, 2003) others have been less sanguine. As Edward Hasbrouck put it:
Passenger Name Records (PNR's) maintained by airlines, computerized reservations systems or "global distribution systems" (CRS's/GDS's), and travel agencies don't just contain flight reservations and ticket records. They include car, hotel, cruise, tour, sightseeing, and theater ticket bookings, among other types of entries. PNR's show where you went who went, when, with whom, for how long, and at whose expense. Behind the closed doors of your hotel room, with a particular other person, they show whether you asked for one bed or two. Through departmental and project billing codes, business travel PNR's reveal confidential internal corporate and other organization structures and lines of authority and show which people were involved in work together, even if they traveled separately. Particularly in the aggregate, they reveal trade secrets, insider financial information, and information protected by attorney-client, journalistic, and other privileges. Through meeting codes used for convention and other discounts, PNR's reveal affiliations -even with organizations whose membership lists are closely-held secrets not required to be divulged to the government. Through special service codes, they reveal details of travelers' physical and medical conditions. Through special meal requests, they contain indications of travelers' religious practices -a category of information specially protected by many countries. (Hasbrouck, 2003) As initially proposed, though, CAPPS II was passive in the sense that it was to be based not on the acquisition of new sets of data, but rather on the integration of existing data. If as it was originally articulated Passenger Name Records were to be central to the system, the system would also draw on a wide range of government records, including immigration records and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database; and it would also draw on publicly available records, including data now included in consumer credit reports, banking records, and address and telephone records.
Important features of the CAPPS II system in fact sound remarkably similar to those of geodemographic systems. For example, using non-obvious relationship analysis (NORA), one suggested form of analysis would compare the current and recent addresses of each passenger with the current and recent addresses of people on a list of suspected terrorists. Similarly, one could make a comparison of telephone numbers of passengers and of suspected terrorists, in order to find people who may have been roommates. Another form of analysis would look at the record of flights taken by airline passengers, and would compare their seating locations with those of others. In each case, though at different scales, there is a strong sense that a form of geographical analysis may be used to ferret out people to be treated with suspicion, by discovering those with whom they have associated, where propinquity is taken as evidence of association; you are where you live, or the person next to whom you sit on an airplane.
So in CAPPS II, as in geodemographic profiling, location becomes a lingua franca. If one knows a location -a street address, wired-telephone number, latitude and longitude, or even airline flight and seat number -one can use that datum as a means of associating activities and participants one with another, and creating an image of the whole. The desire may be to find potential deodorant buyers or potential hijackers, but the method can be the same.
But CAPPS II resembles geodemographic profiling in another way. Like informational profiling more generally, it tends to be pulled back into an appeal to narrative and symbol. This is no surprise; like geodemographic profiling, CAPPS II claims to be oriented neither toward the development of an understanding of the nature or character of a group nor toward the development of an understanding of the nature or character of an individual. That an individual is a member of a group is of interest only to the extent that it helps enable the prediction that that person is likely to engage in dangerous and illegal acts while on an airliner. And in the matter of 'the commission of a dangerous act,' narrative is the obvious method for representation.
But it is more than that. If we see CAPPS II as a system that has integrated a large number of records, each in turn potentially containing a large amount of information, then the obvious question is, how do we sort through information on each of the many passengers who each day fly on a commercial airliner, and single out those who potentially pose a danger? How do we answer Michael Jackson's question, 'Is this individual a known and rooted member of the community?' But here it seems clear that Jackson's question presupposes something, it presupposes a further belief that a person who is a 'known and rooted member of a community' simply will not get on an airplane and engage in an illegal act. Indeed, it is this hidden premise, and the specification of its elements, that must provide the analytical foundation upon which CAPPS II is built. That is, the data analysis to be performed within CAPPS II requires that one 'feed into the machine' a set of possible plots, a set of possible stories of treacherous acts.
One of the stories is that people who are in spatial proximity one with another are associated one with another; another is that people do things that are like those done by people with whom they associate. But beyond these rather general sets of beliefs about the actions that people are likely to undertake, there need also be stories about the acts themselves. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make an application for an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, r ecords, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.
If the earlier version in a very specific way encoded into law the plots of the Trade Center and Oklahoma City Bombings, a half-dozen years later Congress took a different tack, authorizing the FBI to engage in what can only be described as shopping expeditions. Here Congress laid out the extremes within which a profiling system must operate. The earlier version imagines a world in which there are a limited number of terrorist threats, where the success of those recent bombings is an indicator of their future likelihood. Indeed, the federal code literally encodes the previous bombings, where individuals used rental trucks and stored their materials in rental storage buildings. The newer version leaves to the imagination of FBI analysts the construction of likely scenarios, and sets no limits to the number or nature of those scenarios.
If in retrospect the earlier version seems naively, even ludicrously, blinkered, the openness of the later version is not necessarily a sign that it will lead to a more sophisticated or effective form of profiling. Indeed, evidence extending from the FBI's 1960s assertions of the direct connection between anti-war protestors and the Soviet Union to the more recent focus on the shoes worn by airline passengers suggests that American law-enforcement agencies may not be the best source of the narratives that underpin passenger profiling systems.
But the ways in which these informational profiles in practice revert to a concern with narrative and symbol suggests a more intractable problem. One might believe it possible for analysts to develop sets of potential terrorist or criminal plots, narratives that delineate structures of actions, but that have no content. These, one might imagine, could be transformed into profiles against which passenger data could be compared. But consider again the profiler's question: 'Is this individual a known and rooted member of the community?' If this question presupposes a belief that a person who is a 'known and rooted member of a community' will not get on an airplane and engage in an i llegal act, it also suggests a particular way of thinking about the issue of identity. And this is because here the idea of a 'rooted' member seems clearly to involve a sense of permanence; indeed, this formulation echoes a long series of claims made against groups such as Jews and Roma that they are somehow defective because they are not rooted in a particular place (Eliot, 1949) . Here to be defective is to lack a 'genuine' culture, and in turn, to lack the necessary foundation for individual identity. And it is for that reason to be beyond the possibility of successful profiling; not to be rooted is to be predictably beyond prediction.
The trusted traveler revisited
In the real world, though, this is not the conclusion that one wishes to reach. And indeed, it is not the one that the developers of CAPPS II have reached; they seem quite convinced that the system will in practice help reduce the dangers of air travel, and the dangers of the use by terrorists of passenger aircraft for the delivery of weapons, or as weapons themselves. But their success appears to rely on at least one of two possibilities. First, the system may be reconceptualized as one not for finding treacherous travelers, but rather for finding trusted travelers. In fact, within the airline industry there has emerged an i ncreasing interest in this strategy. For example, in their application of Security Directive 96-05 several airlines apparently accept membership in their frequent flier club in lieu of a more generally available document. 6 And there already exist a number of government-based models of trusted traveler systems, primarily used for expediting border crossings, such as the INS's INSPASS, the Dutch Privium, and Tel Aviv's Express Entry Program. These systems typically involve an initial security check, the registration of a biometric identifier (INSPASS and Express Entry use hand scans; Privium uses iris scans), and an annual fee.
On the basis of the success of those programs, some in the United States have argued in favor of the creation of a more general, government-run system. In 2002 a General Accounting Office feasibility study concluded that while the systems raise difficult issues, "such a program could be part of an enhanced customer package for travelers". (United States General Accounting Office, 2002: 9) . Not surprisingly, these systems are in the first instance directed toward the frequent traveler. Indeed, a glance at the Web sites of any of the three major developers of trustedtraveler systems mentioned above will show a photograph of a person who looks very much like the one in Figure 5 . (I counted three white males and two white females, all in business attire.). Perhaps remarkably, in Germany and the Netherlands, as in the United States, the white male businessman remains a model of trustworthiness, of someone who belongs on an airplane, as well as of a customer whom it would be best not to alienate. 7
Although they would seem to be identical to programs for identifying treacherous travelers, trusted traveler programs in fact raise rather a different set of issues. This is because they need not merely to pick out a pattern of suspicious activity, but also to discern places where a lack of information may indicate that the individual is not who he claims to be. Here the appeal to narrative is explicit, where it is imagined that in his or her life a person must have done certain things, and must have created certain trails of information; not to have fit within these imagined There is, though, a second possible means to success for CAPPS II and other similar systems. This one, too, has in fact been explored. Although NORA (non-obvious relationship analysis) is described as a profiling method, it is in fact, if the examples given are to be believed, something else. For the examples, of using information sources to determine a person's actions and to identify the people with whom he or she associates, are in fact not concerned with finding out what a person is like, or what her dispositions are. Rather, it is an information-intensive method of surveillance. And its goal is not to infer a plausible story about the individual, but rather to determine what he has done, and with whom. Where profiling draws inferences (people in this place are likely to use marijuana; you live in this place; therefore, you are likely to smoke marijuana), NORA draws connections (you lived with a drug dealer; therefore you are involved in drug dealing). It for that reason raises a different, and more troubling, set of questions.
